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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996 the passage of the much-anticipated amendments to
Florida’s Administrative Procedure Act (APA)1 set the stage for a notable controversy surrounding the authority of state administrative
agencies to promulgate rules. The amendments decidedly changed
the prevailing standard for determining whether the Florida Legisla-

* Law Clerk to the Honorable John E. Steele, U.S. District Court, Middle District of
Florida. B.A., University of North Florida, 1991; M.A., University of North Florida, 1994;
J.D., Florida State University College of Law, 1998. The author extends special thanks to
Professor Jim Rossi for his support and encouragement of all students of Florida administrative law.
1. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 96-159, 1996 Fla. Laws 147 (current version at
FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1997 & Supp. 1998)).
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ture had properly delegated authority to administrative agencies.
The revised APA rejected the long-applied standard that an administrative rule would be deemed valid if it was “reasonably related to
the purposes of the enabling legislation and [was] not arbitrary or
capricious.”2 The revised statute required more in that “[a] grant of
rulemaking authority is necessary but not sufficient to allow an
agency to adopt a rule; a specific law to be implemented is also required. An agency may adopt only rules that implement, interpret, or
make specific the particular powers and duties granted by the enabling statute.”3
The meaning of the phrase “particular powers and duties,” however, was unclear. Neither the statute nor the legislative history defined the specificity required in an agency’s delegated powers and duties in order for the Legislature to validly grant rulemaking authority. The First District Court of Appeal recently addressed this issue
in St. Johns River Water Management District v. ConsolidatedTomoka Land Co.,4 in which a group of corporate and private landowners in the Tomoka River and Spruce Creek area challenged the
St. Johns River Water Management District’s (District) authority to
create several proposed rules.5 According to the District, the proposed
rules were intended to do the following: (1) add the Tomoka River
and Spruce Creek Hydrological Basins as new geographic areas of
special concern and impose more stringent permitting standards and
criteria for systems in those areas; and (2) set water recharge standards and establish riparian habitat protection zones.6 The landowners argued, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) agreed, that the
District had exceeded its rulemaking authority in violation of sections 120.52(8) and 120.536(1), Florida Statutes,7 when it proposed
these rules.8 The landowners submitted that these rules went beyond
the “particular powers and duties” delegated by the Legislature to
the District.9 The First District Court of Appeal, however, reversed
2. See General Tel. Co. of Fla. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 446 So. 2d 1063, 1067
(Fla. 1984) (applying the “reasonably related” test and citing FLA. STAT. § 350.172(2)
(1981)).
3. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 96-159, § 3(8), 1996 Fla. Laws 147, 150 (current
version at FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (Supp. 1998); id. § 9, 1996 Fla. Laws at 159 (current version at § FLA. STAT. § 120.536(1) (1997)). The new standard for agency rulemaking authority can first be found in the definition of “invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority”
in section 120.52(8). The same language is repeated in section 120.536, which restates the
new standard for rulemaking authority and also provides for a “look back” mechanism to
address existing rules that may not adhere to the new standard.
4. 717 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
5. See id. at 76-77.
6. See id. at 75.
7. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.52(8), .536(1) (Supp. 1996).
8. See Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co. v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., DOAH
Case No. 97-0870RP, at 59 (Final Order entered June 27, 1997) [hereinafter Final Order].
9. Id. at 43-44.
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the decision of the ALJ, finding that the agency had acted within the
authority delegated by the Legislature in proposing the rules at issue.10 In the wake of the new restrictions imposed on administrative
agencies by the revised APA, the ruling scored an important victory
for both the agency and proponents of administrative discretion and
expertise.
This Note will discuss the policy implications of the new rulemaking standard and the impact of the Consolidated-Tomoka opinion
on future rule promulgation and challenges. The new rulemaking
standard has already significantly impacted the role of administrative agencies in the implementation of laws. First, as demonstrated
in Consolidated-Tomoka, the text of the new standard, though obviously a restraint on existing rulemaking authority, was facially unclear.11 The decision of the First District Court in ConsolidatedTomoka should assist agencies and those subject to agency rules in
their future understanding of what “particular powers and duties”
agencies must be granted in order to make rules. Second, the new
rulemaking standard has rekindled criticism of the issuance of final
orders by ALJs rather than by the agency.12 Where a rule challenge
alleges an invalid exercise of delegated authority, should reviewing
courts defer to the ALJ’s interpretation of the agency’s “particular
powers and duties,” or to the agency’s interpretation? In some situations, deferring to the ALJ’s interpretation would directly conflict
with the notion of administrative expertise in interpreting statutes.
Third, the “look back” provision contained in section 120.536(2), Florida Statutes, requiring a review of all agency rules promulgated prior
to the revisions,13 potentially violates the separation of powers doctrine where the statute allows the Legislature to veto the executive
branch through the elimination of undesirable rules.14 Finally, despite the court’s decision in Consolidated-Tomoka, the new rulemaking standard may cause agencies to avoid rulemaking in favor of
nonrule processes such as adjudication and policy statements.15 This
result is in extreme conflict with the express desire in Florida for
presumptive rulemaking, if at all feasible and practicable.16
Part II of this Note will examine the history of rulemaking
authority in Florida prior to the 1996 APA revisions, giving special
10. See St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co., 717 So.
2d 72, 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
11. See discussion infra Part V.B.; see also Consolidated-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 79
(stating that “the phrase ‘particular powers and duties’ in section 120.52(8) could have
more than one meaning”).
12. See discussion infra Part V.C.
13. See FLA. STAT. § 120.536(2) (Supp. 1998).
14. See discusssion infra Part V.D.
15. See discussion infra Part V.E.
16. See FLA. STAT § 120.54(1) (Supp. 1998).
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consideration to the strict separation of powers requirement in the
Florida Constitution. Part III summarizes the standards of rulemaking authority by reviewing key rule challenge cases prior to the
1996 revisions. The legislative history and political background of the
APA revisions are summarized in Part IV. Part V then provides the
background of the Consolidated-Tomoka case and discusses the
court’s interpretation of the new rulemaking standard. Part V describes potential repercussions of the new rulemaking standard not
directly at issue in Consolidated-Tomoka. Finally, Part VI concludes
by predicting how the court’s ruling is likely to impact agencies,
courts, and those who challenge agency rules.
II. RULEMAKING AUTHORITY PRIOR TO THE 1996 REVISIONS
The principle that agencies may only act within the scope of their
delegated authority is central to the study of administrative law.17
Scholars have discussed and debated the rulemaking authority of
agencies nearly as long as agencies have existed.18 For a delegation of
authority to an agency to be proper, the legislature must sufficiently
guide the agency as to the purpose and intent of the laws to be implemented. The necessary degree of guidance can differ greatly vis-àvis the federal and state governments. At the federal level, the
United States Supreme Court has upheld congressional grants of
broad and vaguely defined rulemaking power to the agencies.19 However, in many of the individual states, including Florida, the nondelegation doctrine “retains a certain vitality.”20 Florida case law
bears out this statement in word, if not by deed.21
17. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“So long as Congress
>shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.’” (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co.
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928))).
18. See generally SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF
CONGRESSIONAL POWER (1975); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY:
HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993); Samuel W. Cooper,
Notes: Considering “Power” in Separation of Powers, 46 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1994); Kenneth
Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713 (1969); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Delegation Debate and Competing Ideals of the Administrative Process, 36 AM.
U. L. REV. 419 (1987); J. Skelly Wright, Review: Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J.
575 (1972).
19. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 863 (1984) (concluding that Congress intentionally left certain policy decisions to
the administrator in the area of environmental emissions because the competing interests
in Congress could not agree); see also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944)
(upholding a statute that empowered an administrator to promulgate war-time price control standards that would be “generally fair and equitable and . . . effectuate the [enumerated] purposes of this Act”).
20. WALTER GELLHORN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 90 (8th ed. 1987); accord LOUIS
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 76-77 (1965) (suggesting that
state courts are especially likely to strike down delegations as improper in situations in-
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A. Florida’s Strict Separation of Powers and the Issue of
Nondelegation
Florida’s separation of powers doctrine is far more stringent than
that of the federal government.22 The United States Constitution
provides that “all legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives.”23 The Florida Constitution more explicitly
declares: “The powers of the state government shall be divided into
legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to
one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the
other branches unless expressly provided herein.”24 The Florida Constitution further states that the two houses of the Florida Legislature
hold all lawmaking power.25 While the Florida Constitution recognizes the presence of agencies, it does not grant any legislative or
quasi-legislative authority to agencies.26
Even though agency rulemaking was not contemplated in the federal or state constitution, it has been allowed as a necessary delegation of legislative power.27 The complexities of law and society make
it impossible for legislatures to address and decide every issue pre-

volving real property or the practice of a profession, as the uncertainty of standards “encourages undetectable discrimination or subjective notions of policy”).
21. In reality, Florida courts generally uphold statutes that delegate authority to
agencies as constitutional. See Johnny C. Burris, Administrative Law: 1991 Survey of Florida Law, 16 NOVA L. REV. 7, 11 (1991) (emphasizing that administrative agencies may not
exercise any powers not expressly delegated to them).
22. See B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987, 991-92 (Fla. 1994). The Florida Supreme Court
has emphasized “that Florida has expressly and repeatedly rejected whatever federal doctrine can be said to exist regarding nondelegation.” Id. at 992; accord Brown v. Apalachee
Reg’l Planning Council, 560 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 1990); see also Department of Ins. v. Southeast
Volusia Hosp. Dist., 438 So. 2d 815, 820 (Fla. 1983).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
24. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
25. See id. art. III, § 1.
26. See id. art. V, § 1 (stating that “[c]ommissions established by law, or administrative officers or bodies may be granted quasi-judicial power in matters connected with the
functions of their offices”).
27. See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
SYSTEM 56-57 (3d ed. 1992). Mashaw states:
The [Supreme] Court’s reiteration of the nondelegation principle, coupled
with its very sparing use to strike down legislation, illustrates a continuing judicial effort to harmonize the modern administrative state with traditional notions of representative government and the rule of law. It testifies also to a judicial sense . . . that legal techniques short of declaring statutes invalid are
generally preferable means for accommodating the necessities of public policy
with effective control of administrative discretion.
Id.; see also F. Scott Boyd, Legislative Checks on Rulemaking Under Florida’s New APA, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 309, 313 (1997) (stating that despite the stringent limitation of lawmaking power contained in the Florida Constitution, “Florida courts have found the delegation of some lawmaking power to administrative agencies inevitable” (citing Jones v.
Kind, 61 So. 2d 188, 190 (Fla. 1952))).
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sented.28 Administrative agencies, for all their drawbacks,29 are able
to address regulation with greater experience, expertise, and flexibility than legislatures.30 This notion is illustrated at the federal level
in the functions of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The
EPA is charged with developing and enforcing national standards for
air quality, water quality, and hazardous waste treatment and disposal, among other responsibilities.31 In defining, monitoring, and enforcing these environmental standards, the EPA performs functions
that Congress lacks the time or expertise to carry out. In this context, efficient lawmaking requires allowing agencies to relieve Congress of the burden of filling in the details of stated policy. Though
the idea of delegation of authority to agencies has been accepted at
both the federal and state levels for decades, proper delegation places
constraints on the agency in the form of legislative guidelines.
By declaring that agencies have no inherent rulemaking authority,32 and that all rules must be “authorized by law and necessary to
the proper implementation of a statute,”33 Florida’s APA explicitly
recognizes the need for agency constraint. These legislative guidelines ensure that agencies are carrying out the intent and purpose of
the statute to be implemented.

28. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“[I]n our increasingly
complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply
cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”); see
also Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 924 (Fla. 1979) (“Flexibility by an
administrative agency to administer a legislatively articulated policy is essential to meet
the complexities of our modern society . . . .”); State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 56 Fla.
617, 656-658, 47 So. 969, 982-84 (1908) (upholding an agency regulation imposing penalties for common carriers in the field of intrastate transportation).
29. There are many criticisms of the administrative process. See, e.g., PAUL J. QUIRK,
INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 84-89 (1981) (agencies are susceptible of “capture” by private interest groups); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade
in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1686-87 (1995) (agencies are scientifically incompetent); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992) (agencies can be inflexible in their rulemaking); 1
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 27 (1958) (agencies are allowed excessive discretionary power).
30. See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE
LAW AND MAKE POLICY 27-35 (1994); see also ARTHUR E. BONFIELD & MICHAEL ASIMOW,
STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 14-15 (1989); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1516-19 (1992).
31. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 84 Stat. 2086 (1970).
32. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(e) (Supp. 1998).
33. Id. § 120.54(1)(f).
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B. Rulemaking Guidelines
The Florida APA, adopted in 1974,34 was mainly geared toward
combating the problem of “phantom government”35 in which
government “operates by rules known only to a select few and which
are inconsistently applied.”36 Florida’s first APA concentrated on
rulemaking processes that included public participation,37 rule
challenges,38 and rule publication.39 The Act contained very little
guidance for agencies, hearing officers, or courts to determine
whether a rule was a valid exercise of the legislative authority
delegated to the agency by the Legislature.40
As evidenced by the case law, a number of standards have been
applied over the years. The Florida Supreme Court has directed the
Legislature to provide agencies with “an intelligible principle,”41
“adequate standards” for ministerial agencies,42 “objective guidelines
and standards,”43 “adequate guidelines,”44 and “reasonably definite
standards.”45 Whatever the precise name for the standard, legislation
should inform the agency of the “fundamental policy” necessary for

34. See Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 74-310, 1974 Fla. Laws 952 (current version at FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1997 & Supp. 1998)).
35. The term “phantom government” is said to have been coined by Sen. Dempsey J.
Barron, Dem., Panama City, 1957-88. See Stephen T. Maher, Getting Into the Act, 22 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 277, 280 n.8 (1994).
36. James P. Rhea & Patrick L. “Booter” Imhof, An Overview of the 1996 Administrative Procedure Act, 48 FLA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1996); see also GOVERNOR’S ADMIN. PROC. ACT
REVISION COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 18 (Feb. 20, 1996) [hereinafter APA COMM’N REPORT].
37. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2) (Supp. 1974).
38. See id. §§ 120.54(3), .56.
39. See id. § 120.55.
40. See Patricia A. Dore, Access to Florida Administrative Proceedings, 13 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 965, 1010-12 (1986) (“[I]n this initial version of the validity challenge provision, no
grounds for challenging the validity of proposed rules were specified and no requirement
that the petition must allege facts sufficient to show that the challenger ‘would be substantially affected’ by the proposed rule was imposed.”).
41. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Anderson, 74 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1954) (holding that a
zoning ordinance prohibiting construction and operations if injurious to other properties
and objectionable to neighbors failed to establish an intelligible principle for the guidance
of the Building Inspector and the Board of Adjustment in the performance of their duties).
42. Delta Truck Brokers, Inc. v. King, 142 So. 2d 273, 275 (Fla. 1962) (holding that a
statute authorizing the Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission to grant licenses
delegated an unlimited discretion to the Commission to determine the best way in which
the public interest would be served).
43. High Ridge Mgmt. Corp. v. State, 354 So. 2d 377, 380 (Fla. 1977) (finding that sections of the Omnibus Nursing Home Reform Act was an unlawful delegation of authority
because the Act lacked “objective guidelines and standards for enforcement”).
44. Smith v. State, 537 So. 2d 982, 986 (Fla. 1989) (stating that legislative delegation
of authority to agencies to promulgate rules implementing legislative enactments are valid
if accompanied by adequate guidelines).
45. B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987, 993 (Fla. 1994) (stating that the Legislature has exclusive power to decide reasonably definite standards used to implement policy).
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rulemaking.46 Equally important is the notion that courts must also
be able to evaluate agency action in relation to the framework of articulated legislative policy:
In the final analysis it is the courts, upon a challenge to the exercise or nonexercise of administrative action, which must determine
whether the administrative agency has performed consistently
with the mandate of the legislature. When legislation is so lacking
in guidelines that neither the agency nor the courts can determine
whether the agency is carrying out the intent of the legislature in
its conduct, then, in fact, the agency becomes the lawgiver rather
than the administrator of the law.47

Following the stated policy of the Legislature, agencies are able to fill
in the details of legislative intent. Courts may then evaluate the validity of agency rulemaking in relation to the policy contained in the
statute.
The nature of lawmaking is not constant, however, and the very
conditions that may require the use of agency expertise and flexibility may also make the drafting of detailed or specific legislation “impractical or undesirable.”48 While some statutes may be explicitly detailed by the Legislature, the subject matter of another area of legislation “may be such that only a general scheme or policy can with
advantage be laid down by the Legislature, and the working out in
detail of the policy indicated may be left to the discretion of administrative or executive officials.”49 In such cases, the Florida Supreme
Court has opined that “greater discretion must be delegated.”50 With
the necessary amount of specificity in the statute varying with the
subject matter to be regulated, it is perhaps only natural that the
distinction between filling in details and establishing public policy often becomes blurred.51

46. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 920 (Fla. 1978). The Legislature
must provide this guidance because “flexibility in administration of a legislative program is
essentially different from reposing in an administrative body the power to establish fundamental policy.” Id. at 924.
47. Id. at 918-19.
48. Department of Citrus v. Griffin, 239 So. 2d 577, 581 (Fla. 1970) (upholding provisions of the Orange Stabilization Act and a subsequent Department of Citrus marketing
order alleged to be an invalid delegation of legislative authority).
49. State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 56 Fla. 617, 622, 47 So. 969, 971 (1908) (upholding the validity of a Railroad Commission rule alleged to be an invalid delegation of
legislative authority); see also Florida East Coast Indus. Inc. v. Department of Comm’y
Aff., 677 So. 2d 357, 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Florida League of Cities, Inc. v. Administration Comm’n, 586 So. 2d 397, 411 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
50. B.H., 645 So. 2d at 993 (citing Conner v. Joe Hatton, Inc., 216 So. 2d 209, 212
(Fla. 1968)).
51. See Boyd, supra note 27, at 314.
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III. THE STANDARD FOR RULE CHALLENGES PRIOR TO THE 1996
REVISIONS
Prior to the 1996 revisions of the APA, any substantially affected
person could seek an administrative determination of the validity of
a rule on the ground that the rule was an invalid delegation of legislative authority pursuant to section 120.56, Florida Statutes.52 A presumption of validity attached to all proposed and existing rules,53 and
the burden was placed on the party challenging a rule to demonstrate, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that one or more of
the following was true: (1) the agency failed to follow applicable
rulemaking procedures;54 (2) the agency exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority;55 (3) the rule enlarged, modified, or contravened
the specific provisions of the law implemented;56 (4) the rule was
vague, failed to establish adequate standards for agency decisions or
vested unbridled discretion in the agency;57 or (5) the rule was arbitrary or capricious.58
Pre-revision courts ruled that administrative agencies were vested
with “wide discretion in the exercise of their lawful rulemaking
authority,” whether it be clearly conferred or fairly implied, provided
that the authority was consistent with the general statutory duties of

52. FLA. STAT. § 120.56 (1995).
53. See Jim Rossi, The 1996 Revised Florida Administrative Procedure Act: A Survey
of Major Provisions Affecting Florida Agencies, 24 FLA. ST . U. L. REV. 283, 302-03 (1997)
(citing Department of Labor & Employ. Sec., Div. of Workers Comp. v. Bradley, 636 So. 2d
807 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); State Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Framat Realty, 407 So.
2d 238, 241 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Agrico Chem. Co. v. Department of Envtl Reg., 365 So. 2d
759, 762 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)).
54. Generally applicable rulemaking procedures were (and still are) contained in section 120.54, Florida Statutes, though certain statutes may create different or additional
rulemaking procedures. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (Supp. 1998); Boyd, supra note 27, at 332
n.140.
55. See, e.g., Grove Isle, Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 454 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla.
1st DCA 1984) (finding a Department of Environmental Regulation rule to be an invalid
exercise of delegated authority because the rule exceeded the agency’s delegated legislative
authority by requiring applicants for a construction permit to demonstrate the “proposed
activity or discharge is clearly in the public interest”).
56. See, e.g., Department of Bus. Reg. v. Salvation Ltd., 452 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1984) (finding a Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco rule invalid because it
added to specifically listed statutory criteria); Department of HRS v. McTigue, 387 So. 2d
454, 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (striking down a Department of HRS rule because the rule
modified specifically stated criteria for licensure eligibility).
57. See, e.g., Florida East Coast Indus., Inc. v. Department of Comm’y Aff., 677 So. 2d
357, 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (finding that rules proposed by the Department were not
vague or without adequate standards).
58. See Florida League of Cities, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 603 So. 2d 1363,
1367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (noting that “section 120.52(8)(e) . . . relating to the term arbitrary or capricious, ‘codifies the long established principle that administrative rules cannot
be arbitrary or capricious, i.e., unsupported by logic, despotic or irrational’” (citing Fla.
H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., H.B. 710 & S.B. 608 (1987) Staff Analysis (Oct. 1, 1987))).
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the agency.59 As stated by the First District Court of Appeal, “the
agency’s interpretation of a statute need not be the sole possible interpretation or even the most desirable one; it need only be within
the range of possible interpretations.”60 The Florida Supreme Court,
recognizing that the grants of authority given to agencies are often
quite general in nature, supplied the oft-quoted pre-1996 standard of
review for agency rulemaking:
Where the empowering provision of a statute states simply that an
agency may “make such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the provisions of this Act,” the validity of the regulations promulgated thereunder will be sustained as long as they are
reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation, and
are not arbitrary or capricious.61

Some courts described the burden on challenging parties as a
heavy one.62 The 1996 revisions moved toward the goal shared by
many in the Legislature and the business community by creating a
“more level playing field.”63 As a result of the revisions, agencies were
no longer able to rely upon the “reasonably related” test and would
be pressed to show a stronger connection between rules and the statute implemented.
IV. THE FLORIDA APA RULEMAKING REVISIONS
Florida’s APA has been amended every year since it was enacted
in 1974,64 yet none of the previous changes were as dramatic as the
1996 revisions. The revisions were not easily achieved—years of debate and proposed bills preceded the enactment of the new APA.65
Many of the previous proposals and recommendations are reflected
throughout the new APA, which is structurally and substantively dif59. Department of Prof. Reg., Bd. of Med. Exam’rs v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515, 517
(Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
60. Id.
61. General Tel. Co. of Fla. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 446 So. 2d 1063, 1067 (Fla.
1984) (emphasis added) (citing Agrico Chem. Co. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 365 So. 2d
759, 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), and Florida Beverage Corp. v. Wynne, 306 So. 2d 200, 202
(Fla. 1st DCA 1975)).
62. See, e.g., Board of Optometry v. Florida Soc’y of Opthalmology, 538 So. 2d 878, 884
(Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (providing the requirements necessary for challenging parties to meet
the heavy burden of showing that the agency exceeded its authority and that the rule is
not appropriate to the ends of the legislative act or the purpose of the enabling statute but
are arbitrary and capricious).
63. See APA COMM’N REPORT, supra note 36, at 23 (recommending that proposed
rules not be clothed in a presumption of validity and that attorneys’ fees should be
awarded to successful challengers of rules).
64. See Donna E. Blanton & Robert M. Rhodes, Florida’s Revised Administrative Procedure Act, FLA. B.J., July/Aug. 1996, at 30, 30.
65. See Rhea & Imhof, supra note 36, at 2-23 (summarizing the legislative history of
the 1996 APA); Lawrence E. Sellers, Jr., The Third Time’s the Charm: Florida Finally Enacts Rulemaking Reform, 48 FLA. L. REV. 93, 95-105 (1996) (same).
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ferent from the earlier Act. The structural changes are intended to
simplify the administrative process,66 and the substantive changes
and additions are intended to add flexibility67 and improve agency
accountability.68
A. The Political Backdrop: Previous Attempts to Revise the APA
The impetus for the recent rulemaking reform can be traced back
at least as far as the formation of the Florida House of Representatives Select Committee on Agency Rules and Administrative Procedures in 1992.69 The Committee was organized for the purposes of
“investigating allegations of agency abuse of delegated authority and
recommending any necessary modifications” to the APA.70 In 1993
the Florida Senate Select Committee on Governmental Reform was
created to improve “‘the effectiveness and efficiency of state government,’” and to “‘ensure that all agency rules are based on statutory
authority and that the rules do no more than the law requires.’”71 In
1994 both the Florida Senate and House of Representatives presented comprehensive proposals for APA revisions through Senate
Bill 144072 and House Bill 237.73 Though the two houses were ultimately unable to agree on the extent of reform, both houses repeatedly passed provisions that contained some version of the reforms
proposed in House Bill 237.74
Similar legislation was filed during the 1995 legislative session.
Among the proposed changes was a provision designed to “level the
playing field” in rule challenges by removing the judicially-created
presumption of validity attached to rules.75 All proposed and existing
rules were to be presumed invalid and the burden would be placed on
the agency to prove that the rule or portion thereof was a valid exercise of delegated authority.76 If the agency failed to meet its burden,

66. See Deborah K. Kearney & Kent Wetherell, The Practitioner’s “Road Maps” to the
Revised APA, FLA. B.J., Mar. 1997, at 53, 53.
67. See Donna E. Blanton & Robert M. Rhodes, Loosening the Chains that Bind: The
New Waiver and Variance Provisions in Florida’s Administrative Procedure Act, 24 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 353, 353 (1997).
68. See Blanton & Rhodes, supra note 64, at 33-34.
69. See Sally Bond Mann, Legislative Reform of the Administrative Procedure Act: A
Tale of Two Committees, FLA. B.J., July/Aug. 1994, at 57, 57.
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting Letter from Sen. Pat Thomas, Senate President, to Sen. Charles Williams, Chair (Sept. 14, 1993)).
72. See Fla. SB 1440 (1994).
73. See Fla. HB 237 (1994).
74. See Sellers, supra note 65, at 97 & n.29.
75. See Fla. CS for CS for SB 536, § 11, at 45 (1995); see also Sellers, supra note 65, at
99-100; APA COMM’N REPORT, supra note 36, at 23.
76. See Fla. CS for CS for SB 536, § 11, at 45 (1995).
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the rule or objectionable portion would be declared invalid and a
judgment for attorneys’ fees would be entered against the agency.77
The 1995 legislation passed both houses of the Legislature, but
was vetoed thereafter by Governor Lawton Chiles.78 Although the
Governor was an outspoken proponent of regulatory reform, he
viewed the bill as too burdensome on agencies.79 The deciding factor
in the Governor’s decision to veto, however, was that the bill did not
repeal section 120.535, Florida Statutes, which required rulemaking
where practicable and feasible.80 Although both the Legislature and
executive branch pursued revisions to Florida’s APA, disagreements
about the revisions ensued in 1994 and 1995.
B. The Recommendations of the Governor’s Administrative
Procedure Act Review Commission
On the same day Governor Chiles vetoed the Second Committee
Substitute for Senate Bill 536, he also issued an executive order reiterating his commitment to the reduction of rules, ordering administrative agencies to repeal obsolete rules, and at the same time establishing the Governor’s Administrative Procedure Act Review Commission (Commission).81 The fifteen-member Commission was comprised of members of the House of Representatives and Senate, attorneys practicing administrative law, the Governor’s chief of staff,
an ALJ, the president of the Florida Audubon Society, a representative of the business community, and the Director of the Center for
Governmental Responsibility at the University of Florida.82 The Governor directed the Commission to review the impact of the existing
APA section 120.535, Florida Statutes,83 and the viability of the Governor’s efforts to reduce the number of administrative rules and restore “common sense”84 to state governance.85
77. See id. at 46.
78. Second Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 536 was vetoed by Governor Chiles
on July 12, 1995. See FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1995 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 68; see also Craig Quintana, Chiles Scuttles RegulatoryReform Bill, ORLANDO SENT., July 13, 1995, at C1.
79. See Rossi, supra note 53, at 277-78.
80. See FLA. STAT. § 120.535 (1995); Rossi, supra note 53, at 287; see also Sellers, supra note 65, at 100-01 (noting that the rationale for the Legislature’s decision to retain section 120.535 was that the Legislature did not wish to return to the days of “phantom government”).
81. See Fla. Exec. Order No. 95-256 (July 12, 1995). Governor Chiles ordered agencies
to review all rules and immediately repeal all obsolete rules in a previous executive order
as well. See Fla. Exec. Order No. 95-74 (Feb. 27, 1995).
82. See APA COMM’N REPORT, supra note 36 (listing the names and occupations of the
commissioners).
83. See FLA. STAT. § 120.535 (1995).
84. Governor Chiles was especially interested in lessening the number of administrative rules. See Rossi, supra note 53, at 287-88 (describing the Governor’s efforts to reduce
regulation). Section 120.535 mandated that all agency policies of general applicability be
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The Commission met over a six-month period in an attempt to resolve the sticking points that had held up previous legislative efforts.86 The Commission’s Final Report endorsed the “simplified APA”
recommended by a committee of government and nongovernment attorneys formed by the Governor’s office, and the addition of a waiver
and variance provision.87 With regard to rulemaking authority, the
Commission reported: “The perception exists that state agencies
sometimes adopt rules and policies that misinterpret legislative intent or go beyond specific statutory authorization. The response to
such criticism often is that laws passed by legislators are so general
that agencies have little choice but to develop their own implementation schemes.”88 To combat this problem, the Commission recommended that legislative staff analyses identify sections of proposed
bills which would require agency implementation and “discuss
whether the bill provides adequate and appropriate standards and
guidelines to direct agency’s implementation of the proposal”.89 The
report also endorsed the inclusion of agency comments in staff analyses of bills.90
This recommendation was partially adopted in the revised APA.
While there is no requirement that staff analyses include consideration of whether proposed legislation provides sufficiently clear rulemaking standards, the APA includes a statement of intent “to consider the impact of any agency rulemaking required by proposed legislation and to determine whether the proposed legislation provides
adequate and appropriate standards and guidelines to direct the
agency’s implementation of the proposed legislation.”91 Though wellintentioned, this precatory language lacks the teeth of the requirement suggested by the Commission. Although some observers believe
that agencies would benefit from legislative consideration of rulemaking at the bill analysis stage92 and that agencies would be able to

published as a rule. For the current version of this mandate, see FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1),
(Supp. 1998). The Governor sent a copy of the book The Death of Common Sense: How Law
Is Suffocating America by Philip K. Howard to every member of the Florida Legislature in
February 1995. Governor Chiles advocated Howard’s message by stating that “[t]he book
identifies ‘Public Enemy Number One’ and that is the rules and regulations and the way
we are presently applying them.” Governor Lawton Chiles, State of the State Address, in
FLA. H.R. JOUR. 23, 24 (Reg. Sess. Mar 7, 1995); see also Rhea & Imhof, supra note 36, at
8-11.
85. See Exec. Order No. 95-256 (July 12, 1995).
86. See APA COMM’N REPORT, supra note 36, at 1.
87. See id. at 6, 9-15.
88. Id. at 16.
89. See id. at 17.
90. See id.
91. Act effective Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 96-159, § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws 147, 149.
92. See Rhea & Imhof, supra note 36, at 34.
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advise the Legislature on the clarity of the standards.93 To date, the
Legislature has not gone so far as to require this.
C. Passage of the New Rulemaking Standard
As stated in the final staff analysis, the intent of the Legislature
in adding the language of section 120.536 was to expand the definition of an “invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as found
in section 120.58(8), Florida Statutes.”94 The change would require
agency rules to be based upon specific statutes rather than general
rulemaking authority.95 The staff analysis expressly states that the
new standard would overrule the line of cases standing for the proposition that “rules and regulations would be upheld so long as they are
reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation and are
not arbitrary or capricious.”96
After years of debate and stalled bills, the APA revisions passed
without controversy in the spring of 1996.97 The revisions incorporated many of the recommendations of the Governor’s Review Commission and included many of the proposals included in the 1995 bill
vetoed by Governor Chiles.98 The inclusion of the new rulemaking
standard contained in sections 120.52(8) and 120.536(1) did not
cause much, if any, controversy within the Governor’s APA Review
Commission or the Legislature.99 Though the legal community’s reaction to the new standard was a bit delayed, several commentators
noted the importance of the new language.100 The ConsolidatedTomoka case involves some of the issues raised by commentators,
while other potential problems have yet to be judicially reviewed.

93. See id.
94. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Rules & Regs., CS for SB 2288 and 2290 (1996) Staff
Analysis 25 (Jun. 14, 1996) (on file with comm.) (evaluating FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (Supp.
1996)).
95. See id.
96. Id. at 23-24, 25 (citing General Tel. Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 446 So. 2d
1063 (Fla. 1984); Department of Labor & Employ. Sec. v. Bradley, 636 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1994); Florida Waterworks Ass’n v. Florida Public Serv. Comm’n, 473 So. 2d 237 (Fla.
1st DCA 1985); Department of Prof. Reg., Bd. of Med. Exam’rs v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515
(Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Agrico Chem. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Reg., 365 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA
1978); Florida Beverage Corp. v. Wynne, 306 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)).
97. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 96-159, 1996 Fla. Laws 147 (current version at
FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1997 & Supp. 1998)).
98. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Rules & Regs., CS for SB 2288 and 2290 (1996)
Staff Analysis 1 (Jun. 14, 1996).
99. See APA COMM’N REPORT, supra note 36; see also Donna E. Blanton, Major Test of
New APA Pending at First DCA, FLA. BAR ADMIN. L. SEC. NEWSLETTER, Jan. 1998, at 2.
100. See Boyd, supra note 27, at 310 (noting that although the amendments relating to
legislative checks on the rulemaking process had drawn little attention, “they alone have
the potential to substantially alter the structure of administrative law in Florida”); see also
Rossi, supra note 53, at 296 (referring to the rulemaking restriction as “remarkable” and a
serious limitation of agency authority).
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V. RULEMAKING AND RULE CHALLENGES AFTER THE 1996 REVISIONS:
CONSOLIDATED-TOMOKA AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS RAISED BY THE
APA REVISIONS
Consolidated-Tomoka is one of the first cases to place the new
rulemaking standard before a reviewing court.101 The case highlights
two of the problems inherent in the new standard. First, section
120.536 is facially unclear as to how specific a statute must be to denote the “particular powers and duties” of an agency. Second, applying the new rulemaking standard requires a new level of statutory
interpretation, making it difficult to justify judicial deference to the
ALJ rather than the administrative agency. Though not raised in
Consolidated-Tomoka, other considerations are also discussed below,
including the constitutionality of the legislative review of existing
rules under section 120.536(2) and the impact of the new rulemaking
standard on agency willingness to make rules.
A. The Background of Consolidated-Tomoka
West of the Intracoastal Waterway on the eastern side of Florida,
the Tomoka River and Spruce Creek flow past the cities of Ormond
Beach and Port Orange through farmland and undeveloped forests.
Though some development is present, the area still supports habitat
for many of the state’s familiar wildlife—migratory birds, manatee,
and white-tailed deer.102 The development of the land bordering the
Tomoka River and Spruce Creek was at the center of ConsolidatedTomoka. The case involved a dispute between the St. Johns River
Water Management District and private landowners.103
The District, one of five in Florida,104 operates under the authority
of chapter 373, Florida Statutes, for the purposes of flood control, re101. Though the appeal was filed prior to that in Consolidated-Tomoka, the opinion in
Department of Business and Professional Regulation v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 23 Fla. L.
Weekly D1745 (Fla. 1st DCA July 29, 1998), was ultimately filed shortly after that of Consolidated-Tomoka.
102. See Ludmilla Lelis, A Ruling About the Rules; Environmental Case Could Limit
the Bureaucracy, ORLANDO SENT., Nov. 30, 1997, at G1.
103. The land owners are Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co.; Indigo Development Group
Inc.; Indigo Group Inc.; Indigo Group Ltd.; Patricia Lagoni as Trustee of Trust Nos. IDI-2,
IDI-3, and IDI-4; Sea View Development Corp.; Leroy E. Folsom; James S. Whiteside, Jr.,
and Joan W. Whiteside; Susan Spear Root; Susan R. Graham and Chapman J. Root, II,
Trustees of the Chapman S. Root 1982 Living Trust; Daniel P. S. Paul, Individually and as
Trustee of the Daniel P. S. Paul Charitable Remainder Trust; Ava and Rufus, Inc.; and
Samuel P. Bell, III, and Anne Moorman Reeves, as Tenants in Common.
104. The St. Johns River Water Management District is located in northeastern Florida. The remaining four water management districts are the Northwest Florida Water
Management District, the Suwanee River Water Management District, the South Florida
Water Management District, and the Southwest Florida Water Management District. For
an overview of the various water management districts and the areas they oversee, see
Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Water Management Districts (visited Jan. 30, 1999)
<http://www.dep.state.fl.us/org/watman/index.htm>.
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source management, and water management.105 The water management district maintains a permitting program through which the
agency regulates development activity to protect water resources.106
The Consolidated-Tomoka Land Company is based in Daytona
Beach, Florida, and is engaged in the citrus and real estate industries, including property leasing, real estate development, and
sales.107 Consolidated-Tomoka and the other land owners, or trustees,
all owned or oversaw real property within the Tomoka River and
Spruce Creek area that would be affected by the water management
district’s proposed rules.108
The Consolidated-Tomoka case arose as a result of several proposed rules and amendments to the District’s applicant permitting
handbook. The proposed rules, which created more stringent standards for development in the Tomoka River and Spruce Creek areas,
were seen by Consolidated-Tomoka and the other landowners as exceeding the District’s rulemaking authority.109 The landowners challenged the proposed rules on most of the grounds listed in section
120.52(8), including the new rulemaking standard.110 The ALJ held
that the statutes cited by the water management district as its rulemaking authority satisfied the portions of sections 120.52(8) and
120.536(1), which mandate that a grant of rulemaking authority is
necessary.111 The ALJ also found that the proposed rules were not
arbitrary or capricious,112 were supported by competent substantial
evidence,113 and did not vest unbridled discretion in the agency.114
The ALJ concluded, however, that the proposed rules did not specify
which “particular powers and duties” were being implemented, as required under the new rulemaking standard of section 120.536(1) and,
as a result, most of the proposed rules and several of the related
Handbook provisions were invalid exercises of delegated legislative
authority.115
105. See FLA. STAT. ch 373 (1997 & Supp. 1998).
106. See FLA. STAT. §§ 373.413, .416 (1997).
107. See Market Guide Snapshot for Consolidated-Tomoka Land (visited Mar. 17,
1999) <http://biz.yahoo.com/p/c/cto.html>.
108. Consolidated-Tomoka owns approximately 20,000 acres in the Tomoka River basin that would be affected by the proposed rules. See Lelis, supra note 102, at G1.
115. See Final Order, supra note 8, at 7.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 46-47.
112. See id. at 18, 20-22, 24, 25, 30.
113. See id. at 30.
114. See id. at 33-34.
115. The following were found to have exceeded the agency’s grant of rulemaking
authority: proposed rules 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.0011, 40C-41.023, and 40C-41.063(6)(a)(d); and sections 11.0(e), 11.5, 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 11.5.4, 18.1, and Appendix K of the
HANDBOOK. See id. at 59. Proposed rules 40C-4.041(2)(b)3 and (2)(b)6, 40C-4.041(2)(g)
(permit required thresholds), 40C-4.051(7) (exemptions), and 40C-41.052(2) (exemptions)
were not invalidated. See id.
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B. The New Rulemaking Standard as Applied in ConsolidatedTomoka: How Specific Must the Enabling Statute Be?
The primary problem with the new rulemaking standard is the
ambiguity of section 120.536. The numerous briefs116 filed in the Consolidated-Tomoka case focused mainly on this point, each urging the
court to adopt a certain definition of the “particular powers and duties” language of section 120.536(1).117 For example, the amicus brief
submitted by the Florida Legislature stated that the new rulemaking
standard is more clear because it further constrains agency action
and provides a better understanding of what is required for rulemaking authority.118 Yet, while it is obvious that the new rulemaking
standard was meant to further constrain the rulemaking authority of
agencies, more restrictions do not necessarily mean clearer standards.
Not all of the language in section 120.536(1), however, is ambiguous. The first sentence is plainly stated and understandable. It reads
that “[a] grant of rulemaking authority is necessary but not sufficient
to allow an agency to adopt a rule; a specific law to be implemented is
also required.”119 Thus, an agency must be granted general rulemaking authority in order to adopt rules in a certain area, and an
agency may only adopt rules that implement statutes other than the
general rulemaking authority statute. True to the statements made
in the final bill analysis, this first sentence of section 120.536(1)
would appear to overrule the earlier precedent that permitted agencies to make rules which were simply “reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation, and . . . not arbitrary and capri116. Due to the importance of the court’s decision and the impact the ruling will have
on various private and public interests, many amicus briefs were filed with the court.
Those amici who filed briefs in support of the District included the Department of Environmental Protection, the Department of Legal Affairs/Attorney General, the Department
of Community Affairs, the South Florida Water Management District, the Southwest
Florida Water Management District, the Governor’s Office, 1000 Friends of Florida, the Sierra Club, and the Florida Wildlife Federation. Amicus briefs supporting ConsolidatedTomoka were filed by a group of corporations and industry associations including the
Florida Citrus Processors Ass’n; the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Ass’n; U.S. Sugar Corp.;
Sunshine State Milk Producers; the Florida Forestry Ass’n; the Florida Fertilizer and Agrichemical Ass’n; the Florida Farm Bureau Federation; the Florida Poultry Federation,
Inc.; the Florida Nurserymen and Growers Ass’n; Florida Citrus Mutual; the Florida Land
Council, Inc.; and A. Duda and Sons, Inc. The Florida Legislature also submitted an amicus brief, mainly in response to the issue raised in the brief of the Governor’s office that
the Department of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) should not issue final orders in rule
challenges. See Amicus Brief for the Florida Legislature at 3-7, Consolidated-Tomoka Land
Co. v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 717 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (No. 97-2996).
117. See, e.g., Brief for Consolidated-Tomoka at 29-30, Brief of Amicus Curiae Florida
Department of Environmental Protection at 12-13, Brief of Amicus Curiae Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs at 10-12, Consolidated-Tomoka (No. 97-2996).
118. See Amicus Brief for the Florida Legislature at 3, Consolidated-Tomoka (No. 972996).
119. FLA. STAT. § 120.536(1) (1997).
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cious.”120 The rules promulgated by the District in ConsolidatedTomoka arguably meet this standard in that the water management
district relied on the general rulemaking authority to adopt rules
pursuant to sections 373.044,121 373.113,122 and 373.418(3),123 Florida
Statutes, and the specific authority to promulgate the proposed rules
addressing permitting criteria for the Tomoka River and Spruce
Creek basins pursuant to sections 373.413(1)124 and 373.416(1), Florida Statutes.125

120. See generally General Tel. Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 446 So. 2d 1063 (Fla.
1984); Department of Labor and Employ. Sec. v. Bradley, 636 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1st DCA
1994); Florida Waterworks Ass’n v. Florida Public Serv. Comm’n, 473 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1985); Department of Prof’. Reg., Bd. of Med. Exam’rs v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515 (Fla.
1st DCA 1984); Agrico Chem. Co. v. State Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 365 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1978); Florida Beverage Corp. v. Wynne, 306 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).
121. Section 373.044, Florida Statutes, provided in part:
Rules and regulations; enforcement; availability of personnel rules.—
In administering this chapter, the governing board of the district is authorized
to make and adopt reasonable rules, regulations, and orders which are consistent with law; and such rules, regulations, and orders may be enforced by mandatory injunction or other appropriate action in the courts of the state.
FLA. STAT. § 373.044, (1995).
122. Id. § 373.113. Section 373.113 provided in part:
Adoption of regulations by the governing board.—
In administering the provisions of this chapter the governing board shall adopt,
promulgate, and enforce such regulations as may be reasonably necessary to effectuate its powers, duties, and functions pursuant to the provisions of chapter
120.
123. Id. § 373.418(3). Section 373.418(3) provided:
The department or governing boards may adopt such rules as are necessary to
implement the provisions of this part. Such rules shall be consistent with state
water policy and shall not allow harm to water resources or be contrary to the
policy set forth in s. 373.016.
124. Id. § 373.413(1). Section 373.413(1) provided:
Permits for construction or alteration.—
(1) Except for the exemptions set forth herein, the governing board or the department may require such permits and impose such reasonable conditions as
are necessary to assure that the construction or alteration of any stormwater
management system, dam, impoundment, reservoir, appurtenant work, or
works will comply with the provisions of this part and applicable rules promulgated thereto and will not be harmful to the water resources of the district. The
department or the governing board may delineate areas within the district
wherein permits may be required.
125. Id. § 373.416(1). Section 373.416(1) provided:
Permits for maintenance or operation.—
(1) Except for the exemptions set forth in this part, the governing board or department may require such permits and impose such reasonable conditions as
are necessary to assure that the operation or maintenance of any stormwater
management system, dam, impoundment, reservoir, appurtenant work, or
works will comply with the provisions of this part and applicable rules promulgated thereto, will not be inconsistent with the overall objectives of the district,
and will not be harmful to the water resources of the district.
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1. Specificity Relative to the Powers Conveyed
The second sentence of section 120.536(1) is most troublesome, as
it provides that “[a]n agency may adopt only rules that implement,
interpret, or make specific the particular powers and duties granted
by the enabling statute.”126 This language was the focus of the court’s
decision in Consolidated-Tomoka. The First District Court of Appeal
acknowledged the possibility of two distinct interpretations of the
phrase “particular powers and duties,” offering that the “statute
could mean that the powers and duties delegated by the enabling
statute must be particular in the sense that they are identified (and
therefore limited to those identified) or in the sense that they are described in detail.”127
In his final order, the ALJ adopted the latter approach, interpreting the phrase to mean that the enabling statute must “detail”
the powers and duties that would be the subject of the rule.128 Under
this interpretation, the ALJ concluded that the rules proposed by the
agency were invalid because the language of the enabling statute
was “merely a general, nonspecific description of the agency’s duties.”129 According to the ALJ, in order to be valid, rules must implement “statutes which describe more specific programs.”130 The First
District Court of Appeal, however, chose the former, less restrictive
interpretation, finding that “the term ‘particular’ . . . restricts rulemaking authority to subjects that are directly within the class of
powers and duties identified in the enabling statute. It was not designed to require a minimum level of detail in the statutory language
used to describe the powers and duties.”131 In choosing the less restrictive interpretation of “particular powers and duties,” the court
stated that “[a] standard based on the sufficiency of detail in the language of the enabling statute would be difficult to define and even
more difficult to apply.”132 The court stated that the concept of specificity is one that is relative and what is specific enough in one circumstance may be too general in another.133
This aspect of the First District’s rationale is supported by a
reading of B.H. v. State,134 in which the Florida Supreme Court
struck down a statute delegating authority to the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services to define actions constituting a
126. FLA. STAT. § 120.536(1) (Supp. 1996).
127. Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co. v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 717 So. 2d
72, 79 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
128. Final Order, supra note 8, at 48.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Consolidated-Tomoka, 717 So.2d at 79.
132. Id. at 80.
133. See id.
134. 645 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1994).
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crime pursuant to a juvenile escape statute.135 In B.H., the court held
the statute unconstitutional because granting an administrative
agency the authority to define a crime was found to be of a different
magnitude than regulation in a noncriminal context.136 Though the
defect in the statutory delegation was quite obvious in B.H., the court
stated that it would be “impossible to adopt a single bright-line test
to apply to all alleged violations of the nondelegation doctrine. . . .
[I]n some instances, the subject matter of the statute may be such
that greater discretion must be delegated.”137 Citing the complexities
of modern society, the court pointed out that flexibility in administering a legislatively articulated policy is essential, and that such
flexibility is most necessary and permissible in areas such as land
use regulations.138
It would follow that under the rationale of B.H., agencies such as
the water management district should be granted greater flexibility
to implement the Legislature’s stated policies regarding land use issues, such as permitting and the designation of areas in which permitting would be required.139 The actions of the Legislature since the
enactment of the rulemaking provision support such a reading. Despite the presence of the new rulemaking standard and the statement of the Legislature that there should be consideration in staff
analyses as to whether there would be enough guidance for agencies
in proposed legislation,140 the Legislature continues to enact legislation granting broad powers to a variety of agencies.141 “‘[S]pecific legislative direction,’” agrees administrative law professor Jim Rossi,
“‘just doesn’t happen.’”142
2. Specificity in Harmony with Presumptive Rulemaking Under
Section 120.54, Florida Statutes
The First District Court of Appeal also favored the less restrictive
definition of “particular powers and duties” to avoid conflict with the

135. See id. at 994.
136. See id. at 993.
137. Id.
138. See id. (citing Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 924 (Fla. 1978)).
139. See FLA. STAT. §§ 373.413(1), .416(1) (1997) (authorizing the Department of Environmental Protection and the water management districts to require permits for the construction, operation, and maintenance of specifically enumerated kinds of activities which
could harm water resources).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
141. See Brief for the Department of Community Affairs as Amicus Curiae at 8-11,
Consolidated-Tomoka (No. 97-2996) (discussing the recent amendments to the Accessibility
Act and the Building Codes Act).
142. Lelis, supra note 102, at G1 (quoting Florida State University College of Law Professor Jim Rossi).
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presumptive rulemaking provisions contained in Florida’s APA.143
Under the Florida APA, rulemaking is not a matter of agency discretion.144 Since 1991,145 each agency statement of general applicability
that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy, or describes
the procedure or practice requirements of an agency must be adopted
by the rulemaking procedure set forth in the APA as soon as feasible
and practicable.146 This legislative imperative was retained in the
1996 APA, despite pressure from Governor Lawton Chiles to remove
the requirement.147 Thus, with the creation of the more restrictive
rulemaking language, agencies were faced with two almost polar imperatives: first, make rules as soon as practicable and feasible, but
second, make only those rules that fall under the domain of the particular powers and duties granted by the Legislature.
Because the APA requires rulemaking even where there is an
agency statement of general applicability, the Consolidated-Tomoka
court reasoned that rulemaking authority could not be restricted to
situations in which the enabling statute precisely details the subject
of a proposed rule.148 Therefore, the court concluded, the legislative
presumption in favor of rulemaking necessarily implies that agencies
have authority to adopt rules “within the class of powers conferred by
the applicable enabling statute.”149 Having read sections 120.536 and
120.54, Florida Statutes,150 in pari materia to reach the definition of
the restriction contained in the phrase “particular powers and duties” as that of identifiable classifications within the enabling statute, the District Court of Appeal set forth the following test to determine the validity of a rule “based on the nature of the power or duty
at issue”:
The question is whether the rule falls within the range of powers
the Legislature has granted to the agency for the purpose of enforcing or implementing the statutes within its jurisdiction. A rule
is a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority if it regulates a
matter directly within the class of powers and duties identified in
143. Consolidated-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 76 (citing FLA. STAT. § 120.56(2)(a) (Supp.
1996), which required “the agency to establish the validity of a proposed rule once it has
been properly challenged”).
144. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(a) (Supp. 1996).
145. See Act effective Jan. 1, 1992, ch. 91-30, § 3, 1990 Fla. Laws 241, 244 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 120.535 (1991), and current version at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1) (Supp. 1998));
see also Rhea & Imhof, supra note 36, at 5-7.
146. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1) (Supp. 1998) (requiring rulemaking); id. § 120.52(15)
(1997 & Supp. 1998) (defining agency statements that meet the definition of a rule). See,
e.g., Matthews v. Weinberg, 645 So. 2d 487, 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (concluding that HRS
exceeded its rulemaking authority by enacting policies dealing with homosexual and unmarried couples without following statutory rulemaking procedures).
147. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
148. See Consolidated-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 80.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.536, .54 (Supp. 1996).
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the statute to be implemented. This approach meets the legislative
goal of restricting the agencies’ authority to promulgate rules, and,
at the same time, ensures that agencies will have the authority to
perform the essential functions assigned to them by the Legislature.151

The court declared, “The Legislature gave the District authority to
identify geographic areas that require greater environmental protection and to impose more restrictive permitting requirements in those
areas, and the District did just that.”152 Thus, the enabling statutes153
granted the District the following powers: (1) the power to regulate
development activity in order to protect water resources; (2) the class
of powers necessary to promulgate rules that classify areas of special
concern; (3) the power to impose more stringent permitting standards; and (4) the power to set water recharge standards and riparian habitat protection zones.154 Agencies, challengers, and ALJs may
now focus on the class of powers granted to the agencies rather than
the presence or absence of more specific programs or policy.
C. The Role of the Division of Administrative Hearings in Rule
Challenges and Judicial Deference to the Administrative Law Judge’s
Interpretation
Though inapposite to the central issue in Consolidated-Tomoka,
the case has led some observers to revive the question of the correctness of allowing ALJs to issue final orders in rule challenge cases.155
Under the Florida APA, challenges to rules or proposed rules are
generally raised before the Division of Administrative Hearings
(DOAH) prior to judicial review.156 Rule challenges are significantly
distinct from agency adjudication challenges. In rule challenges, the
presiding ALJ issues a final order;157 in adjudication challenges, the
ALJ issues a recommended order which is then forwarded to the
agency for issuance of a final order.158 In a different context than in
Consolidated-Tomoka, the practice of DOAH issuing a final order has

151. Consolidated-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 80.
152. Id. at 81.
153. See FLA. STAT. §§ 373.413, .416 (1995).
154. See Consolidated-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 75.
155. See Blanton, supra note 99, at 2 (“The Governor’s Office brief initially questioned–
in a footnote—the validity of section 120.54(4)(c), which gives final order authority to ALJs
in rule challenge cases. The brief suggests that ALJs should only enter recommended orders in rule challenges, as they do in adjudicatory matters.”).
156. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (Supp. 1998). Parties may choose to wait the prescribed
period of time until the agency action becomes final to seek judicial review, but the lack of
a record may be damaging.
157. See id. § 120.54(c).
158. See id. § 120.57 (stating the procedure for an appeal of agency adjudication).
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been criticized but upheld by the First District Court of Appeal.159
However, the practice of DOAH issuance of final orders coupled with
the APA revisions and the scope of review in Florida courts, creates a
key difference regarding who issues the final order effectively limits
the ability of the agency to apply expertise to matters of statutory interpretation.
1. The Initial Question of DOAH Authority to Issue a Final Order
In Department of Administration v. Stevens,160 the First District
Court of Appeal found that the issuance of a final order by an ALJ
did not usurp the role of the judiciary or violate the separation of
powers doctrine.161 In Stevens, the Department of Administration and
the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services challenged the
ALJ’s authority to decide whether agency guidelines were invalid
rules because they were not adopted according to statutory procedure.162 The court upheld the ALJ’s final order on the grounds that
the key in the control of administrative agencies is checked power.
The court quoted Kenneth Culp Davis, “‘As long as we continue to
emphasize the principle of check, we may safely continue our increasingly deep-seated habit of allowing the blending of three or
more kinds of power in the same agency.’”163 In making its decision,
the court also relied upon Article V, section 1 of the Florida Constitution and pronounced that “[c]ommissions established by law, or administrative officers or bodies may be granted quasi-judicial power in
matters connected with the functions of their offices.”164
Stevens is inapplicable to cases like Consolidated-Tomoka because
Stevens speaks to the problem of executive encroachment on another
branch of the government. In cases like Consolidated-Tomoka, executive encroachment is not a problem for the judiciary, but for another
arm of the executive branch: the executive branch becomes split
against itself. Thus, the Stevens court’s reliance on Professor Davis’s
Administrative Law Treatise is erroneous because Professor Davis
discusses different powers within the agency, not within the executive.165
In challenges to agency adjudication, the agency always has the
ability to issue a final order inconsistent with the ALJ’s recom159. See Department of Admin. v. Stevens, 344 So. 2d 290, 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
(upholding an ALJ’s final order which concluded the Department’s guidelines were rules
that were improperly adopted and thus invalid).
160. 344 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
161. See id. at 294.
162. See id. at 292.
163. Id. at 294 (quoting 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 68
(1958)).
164. Stevens, 344 So. 2d at 293 (citing FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1).
165. See DAVIS, supra note 29, at 68.
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mended order.166 This allows the agency to apply its experience and
expertise by taking exception to the ALJ’s recommended order. By
contrast, when DOAH issues a final order in the context of rule
challenges, the agency is deprived of the ability to revisit the issue
and apply its expertise.
2. Complicating the Question with the APA Revisions
In addition to the problems already inherent in depriving the
agency of the ability to issue final agency action in rule challenges,
the recent APA revisions make a difficult situation even worse. With
the expansion of the definition of an invalid exercise of legislative
authority under section 120.536(1) and the express removal of a presumption of validity attached to proposed rules under section
120.56(2)(c),167 agency discretion in matters of statutory interpretation are even more at risk. The new rulemaking standard of section
120.536 raises the issue of who is entitled to deference in matters of
statutory construction when the agency’s rules fall within the scope
of the particular powers and duties delegated by the Legislature. In
cases where interpretation is required, Florida courts have, to some
degree, followed the federal doctrine articulated in Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,168 which requires courts to
give considerable weight to the agency’s construction of the statutes
the agency is entrusted to administer.169
In Chevron, the Supreme Court imposed a two-part test for judicial review of an agency’s construction of the statutes it administers.170 First, a court must determine whether the legislature has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.171 If the court determines that the legislature has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court cannot simply impose its own construction on the statute, as it would in the absence of an administrative

166. See FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(l) (Supp. 1998), stating in part:
The agency may adopt the recommended order as the final order of the agency.
The agency in its final order may reject or modify the conclusions of law and interpretation of administrative rules over which it has substantive jurisdiction.
Rejection or modification of conclusions of law may not form the basis for rejection or modification of findings of fact. The agency may not reject or modify the
findings of fact unless the agency first determines from a review of the entire
record, and states with particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were
not based upon competent substantial evidence or that the proceedings on
which the findings were based did not comply with essential requirements of
law.
167. See id. § 120.56(2)(c).
168. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
169. See id. at 845.
170. See id. at 843-44.
171. See id. at 843.

1999]

CONSOLIDATED-TOMOKA

541

interpretation.172 If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
a specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute.173
Echoing the Chevron test, the First District Court of Appeal in
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Framat Realty,
Inc.174 upheld an interpretive rule of the Department because it represented a “permissible interpretation” that was validated by the
rulemaking process and designed to refine agency policy.175 In delivering the opinion of the court, Chief Judge Robert Smith noted that
the goal of the 1974 APA was “to encourage agencies of the executive
branch to interpret statutes in their regulatory care deliberately, decisively, prospectively, and after consideration of comments from the
general public and affected parties—that is, to interpret their statutes by rulemaking.”176 In upholding the agency’s rule, the court
placed particular value on the agency’s permissible interpretation of
a statute in which the APA provides incentives for rulemaking and
further provides a deliberative process for the development of agency
policy:
Otherwise, the elaborate statutory scheme, pressing for rulemaking and prescribing how it shall be accomplished with maximum
public and private participation, has no productive purpose, and it
has become only a snare for agency action, a device for the evasion,
avoidance, or postponement of effective agency action in its
authorized field of responsibility.177

The court noted that the remedy available to those opposed to the
permissible interpretation of a statute was an appeal not to the judiciary, but to the politically responsive branches of the legislature and
the executive.178
The question of which entity interprets the statute was put before
the First District Court of Appeal again in Department of Insurance
v. Insurance Services Office,179 in which a rule of the Department of
Insurance was found to have invalidly extended the statute.180 The
three judge panel was divided,181 with Chief Judge Smith dissenting
on the ground that there were twelve reasonable constructions of the

172. See id. at 844.
173. See id.
174. 407 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
175. Id. at 239.
176. Id. at 241.
177. Id. at 242.
178. See id.
179. 434 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
180. See id. at 911 (invalidating a rule of the Department of Insurance that prohibited
varying insurance rates based upon sex, marital status, or scholastic achievement of the
insured).
181. See id. at 914.
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term “unfairly discriminate,” some of which would not have represented an “extension.”182 The Chief Judge favored deference in upholding the Department’s construction:
At this stage in the maturity of our judicial system, a modest disclaimer of judicial hegemony in matters of statutory interpretation
would seem to be required by a decent respect for the executive as
a coordinate branch of government, made more responsive to the
public, and more disciplined, by APA processes.183

Chief Judge Smith based his dissent in part on the decisions in Department of Administration v. Nelson184 and Framat.185 In addition,
he recognized the danger of allowing individual judges to select the
single “correct” interpretation of a generally-worded statute that
lends itself to several permissible interpretations: “[A]s we judges
grow more numerous . . . the folly of three judges or a majority of
them declaring the ‘one right answer’ to a question of statutory interpretation, when the executive branch has spoken another permissible answer through rulemaking, becomes more evident and more
dangerous.”186
Though the dissent in Insurance Services Office called for deference to the agency versus the judiciary, the need for agency deference
is the same where individual ALJs, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, are granted greater deference than the agency and where the individual ALJ’s opinion is accorded greater deference by reviewing
courts. This is precisely the result where, in cases like ConsolidatedTomoka, the ALJ, rather than the agency, issues a final order. The
reviewing court applies a different standard of review dependent
upon the route by which the administrative appeal reaches the court.
As made clear in Adam Smith Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Regulation:187
[W]hen reviewing a hearing officer’s determination arising out of . .
. a quasi-judicial rule challenge proceeding, the appellate court’s
standard of review is whether the hearing officer’s findings are
supported by competent substantial evidence. . . . On the other
hand, when reviewing on direct appeal an agency’s adopted rule

182. Id. at 916-17 (Smith, C.J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 927 (Smith, C.J., dissenting).
184. 424 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
185. See id. at 918-19 (citing Nelson, 424 So. 2d at 858). The court in Nelson reversed a
hearing officer’s order invalidating an agency rule as being beyond its legislative authority
and reiterated the principle that “when the agency committed with statutory authority to
implement a statute has construed the statute in a permissible way under APA disciplines,
that interpretation will be sustained though another interpretation may be possible. When
the agency so interprets the statute through rulemaking, the presumption of correctness is
stronger.” Nelson, 424 So. 2d at 858.
186. Insurance Servs. Office, 434 So. 2d at 927 (Smith, C.J., dissenting).
187. 553 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
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arising from a quasi-legislative rule enactment proceeding . . . the
appellate court’s standard of review is that the rule should be sustained as long as it is reasonably related to the purposes of the
enabling legislation and is not arbitrary or capricious.188

Though the standard of review has been altered as far as the agency
interpretation is concerned, there is still a difference in whose opinion is granted deference. Removing the agency’s ability to issue a final order and granting great deference to the ALJ’s final order creates the problem addressed in Chief Judge Smith’s Insurance Services Office dissent—individual judges’ interpretation of a statute is
valued above that of the agency and the potential for meaningful review is essentially nonexistent.
D. The “Look Back” Provision
The implications of the new rulemaking authority standard are
even greater due to the inclusion of a “look back” provision that imposed application of the new standard to existing agency rules as
well as proposed rules.189 In a state with close to 26,000 rules in
place,190 the look back provision immediately impacted agencies in
three ways. First, upon the effective date of the APA revisions, each
agency was given a year to review all of its existing rules and submit
a list of rules of portions of rules which were in violation of the rulemaking standard to the Legislature’s agency oversight committee,
the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC).191 JAPC
then combined and submitted the listings to the Legislature.192 JAPC
submitted approximately 5,850 rules to the President of the Senate
and Speaker of the House of Representatives for determining
whether specific legislation authorizing the rules or portions of rules
should be considered during the 1998 session.193
Second, the agency was required to initiate proceedings by January 1, 1999, to repeal any rule which was submitted to the JAPC and
the Legislature for more specific authorization and was not so
authorized during the most recent session of the Legislature.194
Third, if the Legislature did not enact a more specific authorization
188. Id. at 1274.
189. See FLA. STAT. § 120.536(2) (1997) (requiring each agency to review rules and to
provide a listing to the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC) of each rule or
portion thereof which exceeds the new rulemaking authority standard by October 1, 1997).
190. See Lelis, supra note 102, at G1.
191. See FLA. STAT. § 120.536(2) (1997).
192. See Robert M. Rhodes, FLA. BAR ADMIN. L. SEC. NEWSLETTER, Jan. 1998, at 1.
193. See id.
194. See FLA. STAT. §120.536(2) (1997). Thirty-six “Rules Authorization Bills” were introduced in the 1998 Legislature, 29 of which passed and became law. See generally Legislative Information Services, Final 1998 Bill Citator (visited Jan. 22, 1999) <http://www.
leg. state.fl.us/session/1998/citator/final/subindex.pdf>.
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for a rule and an agency does not initiate repeal proceedings as of
July 1, 1999, JAPC or any substantially affected person may petition
the agency for repeal of the rule on the basis of a lack of legislative
authority.195
The requirements of the look back provision raise potential separation of powers issues similar to that discussed in the landmark
U.S. Supreme Court separation of powers case, Immigration and
Naturalization Services v. Chadha,196 in which a legislative body asserted a type of veto power over previously delegated executive
authority.197 In Chadha, a federal statute permitted one house of
Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the executive
branch to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United
States.198 The Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional because the decision of the Attorney General was made pursuant to
authority delegated by Congress.199 To comply with constitutional requirements of separation of powers, the Court stated that Congress
must abide by its delegations of authority until such delegation is
legislatively revoked or altered.200
The look back provision of the APA is similar to the legislative
veto in Chadha in that the Legislature has statutorily created a process in which rules that were previously considered valid exercises of
delegated legislative authority may be repealed in cases where the
Legislature does not enact new authorizing legislation.201 This process allows the Legislature to revisit rules and potentially secondguess the agency’s implementation processes without following the
typical procedure for altering or revoking the enabling legislation in
any way. Although the actual results of the look back provision and
rule repeal activity are as yet unknown, the process is potentially
devastating to the preservation of agency discretion in implementing
statutes.
E. Comparable State and Federal Legislation and the Potential for
Rulemaking Avoidance
Florida is not the only state to seek greater accountability through
the restriction of agency rulemaking authority. In 1995 the Washington Legislature passed a regulatory reform bill that, among other
things, required agencies to have clearer statutory authority to write

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See FLA. STAT. §120.536(2) (1997).
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
See id. at 923.
See id. at 925 (describing the effect of 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2)).
See id. at 953.
See id. at 953-54.
See FLA. STAT. § 120.536(2) (1997).
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rules.202 In adopting the law, the Washington Legislature pronounced, “[S]ubstantial policy decisions affecting the public [are to]
be made by those directly accountable to the public; namely the legislature . . . state agencies [are] not to use their administrative
authority to create or amend regulatory programs.”203 Several sections of the Washington Regulatory Reform Act impose a restriction
on certain agency heads similar to that in section 120.536, Florida
Statutes. In Washington the agency administrator “may not rely
solely on a section of law stating a statute’s intent or purpose, on the
enabling provisions of the statute establishing the agency, or on any
combination of such provisions, for statutory authority to adopt any
rule.”204
The number of new rules promulgated in Washington has declined since the adoption of the Regulatory Reform Act.205 It has been
suggested that the decline seems to be caused in part by uncertainty
about how strictly courts will interpret the new requirements.206
There is also some evidence that agencies are seeking alternatives to
rulemaking—in the form of guidelines, interpretive rules, and adjudication—in order to formulate new policy.207 A similar response has
been predicted in Florida, where agencies may respond to the new
rulemaking standard by employing nonrulemaking mechanisms,
when possible, to the exclusion of traditional rulemaking.208
As a result of the APA revisions, administrative agencies in Florida now have two reasons to resort to alternatives to rulemaking.
First, as in the Washington administrative system, Florida agencies
rightfully may be unsure how ALJs and courts will interpret their
“particular powers and duties” contained in the new rulemaking
standard. Agencies are less likely to promulgate rules when there is
uncertainty as to whether the rule will fail to meet the new rulemaking standard in the eyes of the ALJ or reviewing court. Second,
with the inclusion of a new provision in Florida’s APA for the award
202. See Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, 1995 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 403 (West).
203. Id. § 1.
204. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.12.045 (1997) (addressing the Commissioner of Public
Lands); id. § 43.20A.075 (addressing the Secretary of Social and Health Services); id. §
43.23.025 (addressing the Director of Agriculture); id. § 43.24.023 (addressing the Director
of the Department of Licensing); id. § 43.70.040 (addressing the Secretary of Health).
205. See William R. Andersen, Of Babies and Bathwater—Washington’s Experiment
with Regulatory Reform, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Fall 1996, at 15.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See Rossi, supra note 53, at 304 (stating that agencies will abandon rulemaking to
the extent that Florida law allows). But see FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(a) (Supp. 1998) (stating
that rulemaking is not a matter of agency discretion and that agencies shall adopt agency
statements that meet the definition of a “rule” as a rule as soon as feasible and practicable). See also Matthews v. Weinberg, 645 So. 2d 487, 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (finding that
HRS exceeded delegated authority by applying policies of general applicability and not
rulemaking procedures).
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of attorney’s fees in the event the agency loses a rule challenge,209
agencies have reason to be doubly wary of initiating rulemaking
where a rulemaking alternative may suffice. Not only will the agency
rule or proposed rule be invalidated, but the agency could potentially
lose financially as well. The budgets of most state agencies are not
large enough to support a number of judgments for attorney’s fees.
Combined together, the new rulemaking standard and attorney’s fees
award provision produce a result that runs counter to the express desire of the Legislature and the community at large210—when an
agency promulgates a statement of general applicability that “implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy,”211 the agency must
adopt the statement by rulemaking “as soon as feasible and practicable.”212
In a similar effort to curb agency abuse of rulemaking authority,
the Minnesota Legislature enacted a provision in 1995 that requires
agencies to publish a notice of intent to adopt rules within eighteen
months of receiving new statutory authority to adopt rules.213 Under
the new law, if notice is not published within the time limit, the
authority for the rule expires.214 Additionally, agencies are prohibited
from using laws existing at the time of the expiration of rulemaking
authority as authority to adopt, amend, or repeal rules.215 Although
the statute prevents an agency from dragging its heels when rulemaking is necessary, it prohibits the agency from engaging in a period of incipient policy development longer than eighteen months.
The statute may also create situations in which rules require
amendment if a poorly drafted rule is noticed and adopted simply to
meet the time limitations. Finally, if an agency is unable to notice a
rule within the time limit, it will be forced to utilize rulemaking alternatives that are less efficient and clear than a rule. Like Minnesota, Florida also has a “use it or lose it” provision that requires rules
to be drafted and formally proposed within 180 days of the enactment of any legislation requiring agency implementation, unless the

209. See FLA. STAT. § 120.595(2), (3) (1997). Attorney’s fees may be awarded in challenges to proposed rules and existing rules, unless the agency can show its actions were
“substantially justified.” Id. An agency’s actions are “substantially justified” if there was “a
reasonable basis in law and fact at the time the actions were taken by the agency.” Id.
210. See APA COMM’N REPORT, supra note 36, at 19 (“The Commission believes that
published rules help provide certainty to the regulated community and also help inform
the general public of an agency’s policies. The rulemaking process provides interested persons the opportunity to comment on proposed rules and give necessary input to an agency
as it develops its policies.”).
211. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(15) (Supp. 1998) (defining “rule”).
212. Id. § 120.54(1)(a) (setting forth the presumption of rulemaking).
213. See Act of May 23, 1995, ch. 233, 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 233, art. 2, § 12
(West) (codified at MINN. STAT. § 14.125 (1997)).
214. See MINN. STAT. § 14.125 (1997).
215. See id.
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statute provides otherwise.216 The provision does not apply to emergency rules,217 and existing rules may be modified without violating
the provision.218 Similarly, the APA allows agencies to develop the
knowledge and experience necessary before a rule is proposed.219
However, the situation may arise where a new rule needs to be made
based upon long-standing statutory authority. Will a nonrule policy
statement be sufficient where the rule could not practicably or feasibly be made, given the 180-day limitation? The answer is uncertain
as no courts have ruled on this question.
Attempts to limit agency rulemaking have also occurred at the
federal level, as evidenced by the stalled Federal Comprehensive
Regulatory Reform Act introduced by Senator Bob Dole in 1995.220
The bill proposed that “any rule that expands Federal power or jurisdiction beyond the level of regulatory action needed to satisfy statutory requirements shall be prohibited.”221 Like the new Florida rulemaking standard, this proposed federal standard is ambiguous, as
the “regulatory action needed to satisfy statutory requirements”222
would likely lack a universal definition.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Consolidated-Tomoka ruling has been predicted to extend beyond the environmental context, affecting “‘everybody’s rules’”223 and
thereby impacting the entire administrative scheme in Florida. Because Consolidated-Tomoka was the first case to define the new
rulemaking standard, the test set forth by the First District Court of
Appeal will likely serve as the guideline used by agencies in their
promulgation of rules, by opponents in their challenges of rules, and
by ALJs in their interpretation of whether rules are authorized under the particular powers and duties granted to agencies. However,
even though Consolidated-Tomoka was a victory of sorts for administrative agencies, the new rulemaking standard is not without teeth.
Though the court found for the agency, the court made clear that
there were greater restrictions placed on agencies, and that rules
must be identifiable with the class of powers delegated by the Legis-

216. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(b) (Supp. 1998).
217. Section 120.54(1)(b) is applicable to all rules other than emergency rules. See id. §
120.54(1).
218. Section 120.54(1)(b) only requires that necessary rules be “drafted and formally
proposed” within the 180-day window.
219. See id. § 120.54(1)(a) (requiring rulemaking as soon as “feasible and practicable”).
220. See S. 343, 104th Cong. § 627 (1995).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See Lelis, supra note 102, at G1 (quoting Scott Boyd, senior staff attorney for
JAPC).
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lature. This restriction of the new rulemaking standard was applied
in a decision handed down on the heels of Consolidated-Tomoka.
In Department of Business and Professional Regulation v. Calder
Race Course, Inc.,224 the First District Court of Appeal reviewed the
actions of another agency in the context of the new rulemaking standard.225 Calder involved a proposed rule challenge brought by several
entities that held permits and licenses to operate pari-mutuel facilities and conduct pari-mutuel wagering.226 These entities227 challenged
a proposed rule of the Department of Business and Professional
Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (DBPR), that set
guidelines for searching people and stables, rooms, lockers, vehicles,
automobiles, or other places within a pari-mutuel wagering permitted facility.228 The ALJ found that the particular powers and duties
required under the new APA were not specifically granted to the
DBPR under the same rationale employed by the ALJ in Consolidated-Tomoka.229 The First District Court of Appeal, however, affirmed the decision of the ALJ in Calder, finding that the rule at issue was not authorized by the statute that allowed the agency to
conduct investigations:
[T]here is nothing in the class of powers and duties identified in
[the statute] that delegates to the Division the right to search persons or places within pari-mutuel wagering facilities, or any provision in the statute deeming a licensee of same to have waived the
protections of the Fourth Amendment by consenting to such
searches.230

Though the result in Consolidated-Tomoka will likely relieve
agency rule drafters to some degree, the result in Calder serves as a
warning to agencies to carefully appraise the class of powers granted
to them by statute before promulgating rules. Consolidated-Tomoka
and Calder will not be the only cases to interpret the 1996 revisions
to the APA. These and the other issues raised by this Note are likely
to be raised many times in the future as the most recent version of
Florida’s APA is adapted to the workings of the administrative
scheme.
224. 23 Fla. L. Weekly D1795 (Fla. 1st DCA July 29, 1998).
225. See id.
226. Id.
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